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7. F1athead, an employee of the Grubb Coal Co., was operating a company truck between
Madison and Sperryville. While traveling east on the two-lane highway he stopped his
vehicle to converse with Rumbum, a local farmer whom he saw walking beside the road.
When he stopped his vehicle, he pulled only partially off of the traveled ' porti on of
the highway, even though there was ample space for him to have pulled completely off
of the road. While his vehicle was in this position it was sideswiped by a Stutz
Bearcat driven by Deadbeat, who was also traveling east. After striking the truck,
the Stutz Bearcat ricocheted acrosL the highway into the west-bound lane where it
collided head-on with a west-bound motorcycle operated by Innocent. The evidence
indicated that Deadbeat had had an unobscured view of the parked truck for almost
600 feet as he approached it down the highway. The day was clear and the road was
dry. Innocent has instituted an action against Deadbeat and the Grubb Coal Co. The
company consults you as to its liability. What should you advise?
·
(TORTS) The Coal Company is not liable. wnere a second tort-feasor should be aware
of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original
tort-feasor and thereafter by an independent act of negligence brings about an
accident, the condition created by the original tort-feasor becomes mere~y a 'circumstance of the accident and is not a proximate cause thereof. See 173 Va.448, 3 s.E.
(2d) 397 on p.l021 of Torts in these Notes •
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B. Hlmfat, a Tidewater rancher, was the proud owner of a spotted hog, Sidney. One
moonless night Sidney disappeared.. Ho.mfat immediately suspected Cornpone, a local
tramp with a reputation for barnyard thievery. He sent his nephew, Bullhead, to
search for Cornpone and Sidney while he called the Sheriff. While hunting for Cornpone, Bullhead was informed by Blab that Seedy, another tramp, had been seen carrying a spotted hog. Bullhead went immediately to the railroad yard and there found
Seedy with a hog that fit Sidney's description. Although Bullhead had never seen
Sidney he correctly surmised that he had found the thief and he immediately hustled
the protesting Seedy off to jail. Meanwhile back at the ranch Hamfat had contacted
Fosdick, a relentless deputy sheriff. Informed of Hamfat's suspicions concerning the
loss of his valuable hog, Fosdi ck went to Cornpone's shack where he surprised Cornpone in the midst of a roast pork dinner. Cornpone denied any knowledge of the theft
and refused to accompany Fosdick since the latter had no warrant for his arrest.
Fosdick then seized the reluctant Cornpone by the arm and escorted him to jail.
There he discovered that Seedy had already confessed to the act.
Prior to the filing of fo~mal charges, it became necessary to determine the monetary value of Sidney. Xuch to Hamfat's dismay, it was determined that Sidney was
worth only $45 on the current market. The case was disposed of accordingly, Seedy
entering a plea of guilty.

•
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(a) Cornpone c~nsulte you in regard to his chances of success in an action for
illegal arrest against Fosdick. How would you advise him?
(b) Seedy consults you in regard to his chances for success in an action for
damages for illegal arrest against Bullhead. How would you advise him?
(TOHTS) Under the Code(V#l8-165) stealing a hog is a felony regardless of the value
thereof. Since a felony actually had been committed and since Bullhead reasonably
believed that Seedy had committed it, the arrest of Seedy by Bullhead, a private
person not an officer, was privileged.
As to Fosdick who was an officer of the law, if he reasonably believed that a
felony had been committed and that Cornpone was the guilty party his arrest of the ~
latter · was also privileged.(Whether or not such a belief was a reasonable one under
the facta of this case can be argued either way}.
~ ~ ,
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9.Dim~ ~tled out of his driveway onto Peach~ree Street without stopping and without looking in either direction. After his vehicle had reached the street he noted a
vehicle approaching at a very high rate of speed from his left. Dimwit turned his
wheels sharply to the right and accelerated his car as much as possible in hopes of
outdistancing the approaching car before it struck him. In so doing he lost control
of his own car and swerved across into the opposite lane~ of traffic where his vehicle
struck that of Indignant. In an action by Indignant against Dimwit to recover
damages, Dimwit asks for an instruction on sudden emergency.
Should this instruction be granted?
(TORTS) The instruction should not be given. One who is himself to blame for the
sudden emergency cannot invoke the doctrine for he was negligent in getting into
such a position in the first place. See 192 S.E.800 on p.l003 of Torts in these Notes

•

10. B~m~~ the operator of a motion picture theatre •. Doom was the owner of an
adjacent building. A fire, originating in Bloom's theatre burned down both the
theatre and the adjacent building belonging to Doom. The fire was so severe and the
damages so extensive that there wa~ no evidence as to the cause of the fire.
May the doctrine of res ips~ loquitur be invoked by Doom in an action against
Bloom to recover damages-caused by the fire?
(TORTS) No. 'rhe fire may or may not have been caused by the negligence of Bloom. It
may have been due to an act of God, spontaneous combustion,the act of a pyromaniac,
a carelessly thrown cigarette, defective wiring,etc,etc. The doctrine of ~ ipsa
lotuitur only applies to those situations. in which accidents rarely occur unless
ae endant has been negligent. See 189 Va.948 on P• lOlS of Torts in these notes.
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o~~rly protective father of Doris Rux, specifically instructed her
fiance, Boris Tanner, to have Doria home by 9:00 o'clock p.m. As the deadline
approached, and the couple had not returned, Rux became greatly exercised and took
down his shotgun and stationed himself on the front porch. At 9:1Sp.m. the couple
drove up to the house in Tanner's oar, and Rux immediately ran down to the car and
began to shout indignities to Tanner and to brandish the gun menacingly. Tanner,
afraid for his safety, quickly discharged Doris and drove off rapidly in the oar.
As he did so, Mrs. Zedd Rux shouted excitedly from the porch, 11 Shoot him Zeddltt;
whereupon Rux fired a shot at the disappearing car, which damaged its re~r end.
In an action for property damages against Zedd Rux, judgment was entered in favor
of Tanner for $100, the cost of repairing the oar, but ·execution thereon was returned tlno effects". Tanner then learned that Mrs. Rux owned prc:>perty in her own name,
and he instituted an action by motion for judgment against her for damages for the
same occurrence, alleging the above facts.
Mrs.Rux filed(l)a special plea ·alleging that the judgment against Zedd constituted
a bar to the action against her; and (2) a demurrer to the motion for judgment.
How should the court rule:(l)on the special plea:(2) on the demurrer?
(TORTS)(l) The court should rule that the special plea is invalid. Mr. and Mrs.Rux
are joint tortfeasors in that Mrs. Rux was present urging and abetting her husband
in the tort. A judgment against one joint tortfeasor is not a bar to an action
against the other joint tortfeasors unless it has been satisfied by express statutory provision(V#B-368).(2) The demurrer should likewise be overruled because one
present and encouraging the commission of a tort is just as liable as the person
who commits the requested wrong. See Pross er on Torts(2nd Ed)p.234.

B. Zedd Rux, the

•

•
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9. Joe Johnson, a student in college in Charlottesville had returned to his home
in Norfolk for a short vacation and decided to seek div~rsion at Virginia Beach.
He invited his fr~end Sam Stiles, an insurance adjuster, to accompany him in
Johnso~'s car. St1les pleaded that he was entirely too busy to take the time off
fro~ h~s work,,bu~ ~hat he had promised a visit to his elderly grandmother, who
res~ded near V1rg~n1a Beach, and that if Johnson would stop briefly at the grandmother's home, he. would then go on to Virginia Beach with Johnson. Johnson then
bought SO ·cents worth of gasoline at a filling station and Stiles offered to pay
7)

•

cents ot it, which offer Johnson aqcepted.
At a eurva on the open highway near Virginia Beach, in a 45-mile per hour speed
zone, Johnson was driving at a ~peed of
miles per hour, when his car struck an
oily spot which was not visible to him. The car skidded off the highway, struck e
tree, and Stiles was injured.
.
Stiles asks your advice as to whether the above facts give him a cause of act~on
against Johnson.
How would you advise him?
.
.
(TORTS) No, for two reasons. In the first place Johnson's negl~gence in go~ng a~ a
ra t e of five miles above the speed limit was not the proximate cause of the. acc1dent.
but the slick oily spot for which he was not to blame. In the next place St~les was
a gratuitous guest. Paying 25 cents on the gasoline and stopping on the way to see
Stiles' grandmother were mere social amenities rather than a bargained for contract.
The only duty owed by Johnson was not to be grossly negligent, and he did not
violate that duty. See Headnote 2 to 194 Va.S41.

25

so

-- ~D

•

•

.

9!Miss Jarvis, an elderly spinster of excellent moral character, took a prominent
part in civic affairs and led a crusade against a rather wide-open night spot. One
of the performers, commonly known as 11 The Complete Stripper," took offense at this
activity, and at one of the perfon,~ances said: "Old Jarvis is just jealous, and if
she had anything worth seeing she might try to show it, but who wants to look at
her.n This statement was so loudly applauded by the audience that the proprietor
printed it in the programs which were distributed at subsequent performanc es.
Miss Jarvis consults you as to any right of action she may have against Stripper
or the proprietor, telling you that of course she hasn't suffered any pecuniary loss
but she wants these people to be made to pay for their acts.
How ought you to advise Miss Jarvis(a)with respect to Stripper and {b) with
respect to the proprietor?
(TO RTS)One answer: A suggestion that a virtuous woman, if she were pretty, might
take off her clothes in public, is insulting. Under the Virginia statute of insulting words no damages need be shown. Hence Miss Jarvis has an action under that
statute against Stripper and the proprietor.
Another answer:(a)The words used are so conditional that they are ridiculous
rather than insulting. They do not constitute slander per se and there were no
damages so Stripper is not liable.(b)In Virginia libel appears to be subject to the
same limitations as slander and hence proprietor is not liable either. See 200 va.
572. Note: It is arguable that proprietor has used Miss Jarvis• name for advertising purposes in violation of her statutory right to privacy and that she is entitled to general and ··' ··· .als o :· punitive damages under the statute. See V#B-650 •

-:r&. o

10. Pedestrian, in daylight, while walking on the eastern sidewalk of Main Street,
started to cross First Street from north to south at its intersection with Main.
While walking between the cross-walk lines he was .struck and killed by an automobile driven by Motorist in an eastern direction on First Street. At the time
Pedestrian was struck he had almost completed his crossing and another step or two
would have put him on the southern sidewalk. There were no traffic signals at this
intersection, and the street was straight and the view unobstructed. Action was
brought for damages and on the trial Motorist testified that he looked down Main
Street for traffic and saw none; he then looked ahead on First Street and saw
Pedestrian directly in front of him, that he applied his brake and cut to his left,
but could not avoid striking Pedestrian. At the conclusion of the svidence,the
r,l c:.intiff requested, over defendant's objection two instructions couched in appropriate language:
'
(a) One telling the jury that if Pedestrian started across First Street before
Motor~st entered the intersection, then Pedestrian had the right of way and it was
~~tor1st•s duty either to change his course, slow down, or come to a complete stop
l i necessary to permit Pedestrian to cross the street in safety, and
~b) T~e o~her, telling the j~ry that, on the issue of contributory negligence,
Peaestr1an ~s presumed to have exercised ordinary care for his own safety and that
the bu:den 1s on the defendant to establish such negligence by a preponderance of
the ev1dence. How ought the court to rule on each instruction?
(TORTS) ~ince these both correct~y. state the law they should both be given.
Note: S1nce these are not Ufinding instructionstt they need only be complete as
to points of law stated therein.
8 .D\~ Impatient aM GUSfie Guest, while shopping in Nortol.k,Va., deci= ~~rave
•
f D
tme t store They arrived at a Tearoom aro
lunch at the Tearoom 0
~
n
• lar 8 crowd there The hostess met them,
p.m., and t!oun~:~ta:~~~: ~~!m~ ;:Ytabl~s in the Tear~om are individual
led them
a
in a row and customers sit behind them on a
tables of standard design &\"ranged
~t people beind the tables, the hostess
long couch against the wall. In ::erthto ~ushes it back when the customer is seatedf
customarily pulls the table out t blen t which Irma and Gussie were seated had
as was done in this instance' 'J.be a es a
im t 1 half an hour
soiled dishes on than. After they had been seate:t~:~t~~~~~ a aw~~ess but was
without being served, Irma tried to ~tt~t.:n:O her right caught her foot on the
unable to do so. She thereupon got up,
n
k your advice as to whether she
leg of the table, fell and broke )ler hip. Irma ~a s What would you advise?
can recover rrom Department Store for h: inj~ ~;·the Store. There was nb defect.
(TORTS) No. There was no negligeooe on e part insurer of her safety. See 194 Va.
The situation was obvious. The Store was no an
lOU.

lO}~~eedy Jones was driving his car down Highway #58 in a southerly direction at •
rapid rate of speed on the nigh of April 28,1960, at about 9s00p.m~ The night was
dark and there was a d~nse fog or mist. Speedy Jones ran into a car driven by Glen
Sike;:~ going in the · same direction and pushed it to the left side of the road where
1t came to a stop. Jones' car ran on a distance of 100 yards from the point of
impact and ran off the road and came to rest in a field. Ula Sikes, wife of Glen
Sikes, who was a passenger in her husband's car sustained back injuries in this
collision.
A car drtven by Robert Todd, traveling in the opposite or northerly direction,
stopped on the. right side of the road beside the Sikes car and effered to take Mrs.
Sikes to the hospital to get something done about the injuries to her back. While
Todd, Ula a.pd Glen Sikes were standing beside the Todd car, an automoblo driven by
,Joe WOodward, traveling in a southerly direction, negligently struck th~ Todd car,
glanced off and struck Ula Sikes, breaking her right leg in two places. The.
Woodward car then crashed into the Sikes car.
Ula Sikes consults you as to whether Speedy Jones can be held responsible for the
injuries she received in both accidents. How should you advise her?
(TORTS) No. Jones' negligence had spent itself completely. The negligence of Weedward was the sole proximate cause of the second accident. See 168 Va.)8.

•
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9.D~osperous Jones is the owner of a large farm on Highway #58 in Henry County,
Virginia, consisting of land and valuable improvements such as mansion house,barns
and other outbuildings. The State Highway Department of Virginia leased a portion
of an adjoining farm owned by Red Barker, and is now operating, through the Highway Department's agents and employees, a stone quarry to supply rock for the construction of public roads. In the operation of this quarry frequent blasts with
dynamite have to be made, which throw large chunks of rock and debris ont,o the
premises of Prosperous Jones, damaging aom.e or Ids outbuildings, and his tenants
have complained that the property is unsafe to be farmed wh:'Lle the stone quarry is
in operation.
Prosperous Jones consultu you as an attorney as to whethe: ~ he may maintain an
action by motion for judgment against the Highway Commissio. -.-r of Virginia for
damages beeaus,e of the careless, reckless and wanton operatir, n of the quarry by the
employees of the State Hight ay Department. How would you adv .i.se Prosperous Jones?
(TORTS) No. The State is no·, liable for its torts as we do net have a st,lte tort
claims act. The employees have the immunity of the State as lo ng as they are acting
within the scope of their authority. There is no evidence that ;-.he Highway
Commissioner was participating personally in the acts complaine~ of. If these acts
amount to a taking of Jones' property his remedy is to mandamus the Highway
Commissioner to bring condemnation proceedings. See 195 Va.655 o~1- P.l of the Torts
St4pplement Cases followint~ P• 1047 of the Torts cases in these no t es.
4~'Pat Jockey, a frequent patron of the race tracks and a etQdent of the art of de-

•

•

ception, conceived the following plan for acquiring ownership of Bull Run, a valuable
race horse, and winning the Virginia Derby, a race for two year olds, with a $100,000
purse: He would contract to purchas 9 Bull Run from Cy Trainer, promising to pay for
the horse five days after thu runnillg of the Derby; and the day following the race
he would sell Bull Run for such price as he could get, pocket his winnings, if any,
and leave for parts unknown, without paying the agreed purchase price. Without disclosing his intentions to Trainer, Jockey procured from Trainer a written contract
by the terms of which Trainer sold to Jockey his horse, Bull Run, for the sum of
$20,000; $1,000 of which was then paid in cash, and $10,000 was to be paid five
days after the running of the Virginia Derby. The contract provided that immediately
upon the signing thereof, title to the horse should pass to Jockey. The contract
was signed and Jockey acquired possession of the hor s e ~ Two days before the Derby,
Trainer was told by Jack Skeeter that since the sale he had had an opportunity to
observe Bull Run in one of his early morning workouts and that his speed was
phenomenal and that the horse should easily win. Skeeter fQrther told Trainer that he
overheard Jockey tell Confidant of his plan to sell the horse after the race and
leave without paying the purchase price. Trainer promptly tendered to· Jockey the
$1 000 he paid and demanded the return of the hors e to h~n. Jockey refused. Trainer
i~ediately consults you and inquires whether he may recover possession of the
horse.
What 1-rould you advise?
(TORTS)(SALES) Yes, Trainer is entitled to bri ng a possessory action for the horse,
or since the horse is unique, he i.s entitled to rescind in equity, because of the
fr;ud. When Jockey promised to pay for the hors e he impliedly represented that he
then had an intent to pay as promised. Whether or not he had such an intent is a
present material fact about which Jockey has lied. Because of this fraud Jockey only
got a voidable title which Trainer may avoid at anytime before Jockey sells to a
bona fide purchaser for value •

B~'Johnny and Freddie Butterworth, 8 and 6 years of age, respectively, lived in the
City of Richmond. The two br.o thers ·took great pleasure in riding atop freight cars
being shifted in the railroad yards along the south bank of the James River. They
had been warned several times. by Vigil, the yard watchman, to stay out of the yard
and not to ride on the car~. On a warm afternoon during the month of May, and in
spite of Vigil's warnings, Johnny and Freddie went to the yards after Johnny had returned from school, and climbed aboard one of the freight cars which was coupled to
a switch engine. Vigil, who the boys thought was off duty, saw them and as the cars
were being moved down the track he angrily yelled in a loud and piercing voice,
"Get off that car or I'll throw you off.n Vigil's loud yell surprised and frightened
both the boys and, as they ran along the top o.f the car, Freddie tripped over a
stanchion which was in plain view, fell to the ground and was seriously injured.
Shortly thereafter Freddie, proceeding by his next friend, brought an action against
both the railroad and Vigil in the Lal-l and Equity CoLU't of the City of Richmond asking damages of $10,000.
In their grounds of defense, the railroad and Vigil asserted (a)that Freddie was a
trespasser to whom was owed no duty, and(b)that, in any event, Freddie was guilty of
negligence which barred his right to recover. Are these good defenses?
(TORTS)(a}Even if Freddie was a trespasser the defendants owed him a duty not to act
negligently toward him after his presence was discovered. Vigil's sudden and unexpected outb1rst against children so young could be found by a jury to have been a
negligent act for which he and his principal would be liable. (b) The rule in Virginia
is that children under 7 are conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence.
9ft>h the morning of August 6,19.58, .Mrs., Shirley Williams was severely injured in an
automobile accident which occLU'red in the City of Norfolk. Shortly after the accident
she was taken from the hospital for examination to a laboratory operated in Norfolk
by Dr. Albert Barr for the purpose of undergoing X-rays to determine the extent of
injuries to her head. While the X-rays were being taken by Dr.Barr, he received an
emergency telephone call which he answered and which cauSed Mrs.Williams to be subjected to the X-rays for a time far greater than was necessary. The X-rays indicating
no skull fractures, Mrs. Williams was returned to the hospital from which she was
discharged three weeks later. In December of 1960, Mrs. Williruns began suffering
from headaches which became progressively worse; and in January of 1961 she became
blind. A subsequent exrunination showed that her blindness had been caused by a tumor
of the brain. On June 14,1961, Mrs. Williams brought an action against Dr. Barr in
the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk alleging that the negligence
of Dr. Barr in x..raying her head for an unreasonable length of time had brought on
her brain tumor and caused her blindness . Dr.Barr now consults you. He admits that
he X-rayed Mrs. Williams an unnecessary length of time, and that this could have resulted in her blindness. On fur~her questioning, he concedes that Mrs. Williams,
prior to her loss of sight, had no way of learning she was suffering from a brain
tumor, or learning its cause. Does Dr. Barr have any defense to the action?
(TORTS) Yes, the two year statute of limitations. Our Supreme Court of Appeals has
held that the statute of limitations starts running in negligence cases as soon as
the wrongful act is comrr1itted whether or not the plaintiff knows or should know that
he has been injur.ed. See 19.5 Va.82'7 in the Pleading and Practice cases in these Notes,
and 185 Va.S6l(the silicosis case)on p.l033 of the Torts cases in these Notes.
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9.D'1lrank Mankin operated a business in which he had six employees. Poinder, Dext-er
and Noble, three of his employees, were engaged to operate a machine which required
skill and constant vigilence to avoid injury to the operators. Because of the temporary absence of Noble, Frank Manl~in took his place at the machine and assisted
in its operation. While the machine was in operation J'1ankin negligently stopped to
light a cigarette and in doing so Poinder's attention to the machine was momentarily
diverted. As a proximate result of the negligence of Manlcin and Poinder, Dexter
was injured. Dexter sued Mankin t.o recover damages. Manldn defended upon the grounC'
that Dexter assumed the risk of negligence of a fellow-servant.
Is t .his a good defense?
(TORTS) No. Since there vlere less than seven employees and no steps had been taken
by the employer to come under ~'Jorkmen' s Compensation, common law principles apply.
At common law the employer him 3elf cannot be a fellow servant. See 126 Va. 319.

10.})~illiam

•

•

Peyton for many years had purchased Grade A milk from the Green Dale
Grocery Store. Peyton and his guest , Smi th, became ill, and upon an examination by
their doctor it was determined that thei:c illnesses resulted from drinking the milk
that had been purchased from the grocery store. It was determined that the milk
was contaminated with germs of malta fever. Green Dale Grocery Store did not expressly warrant that the milk was fit for human consumption. Peyton and Smith employ you to sue Green Dale Grocery Store, if you determi ne that they have a good
cause of action.
What remedies, if any , do Peyton and Smit h have against Green
Dale Grocery Store?
('l'ORTS)(CONTRACTS)(SALES) Peyton may recover from Store as the latter impliedly
warranted that the milk was fit for human consumption. But this implied warranty
ran only in favor of Peyt,on as there :l.s no privity of contract between Smtth and
store. If Smith wants to recover he must p l~ove ne gligence on the part of Store and
there is nothing stated that indicates any such negli gence. See Colonna v. Rosedale
Dairy Co., 166 Va. 3lh. Note: In the light of general language in Swift v. Wells,
the general tendency of the court s aioJay f rom the necessity of privity, and the protection of the guest by the Uniform Commercial Code, S1nith 1 s case would not be hopeless.

Q. 10 on p.546(Sales) Smith may also recover. The Virginia adaptation of u.c .c.
#2-318 reads as follows: "Lack of privity betvreen pla.intiff and defendant shall be
no defense in any a~tion brought a gains t the mar.ufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach of •·m rrant y, expreGs or implied, o:c for negligence although the plaintif:f did n~t ~urchase the good~ from t.he defendant, if the ~laintiff
was a person whom the manuf ac·curer or seller mlght r easonably have expected to use
consume, or be affected by th e goods .''
'

B1~e and Doris had be~n ~datingA for some
r-o- ~--at her home in his autoinobile·. Doris usuall :~;zs, and Pete ~lways called for her
she enjoyed doing so. Pete considered her t; be
the autom~b~le on these dates, as '
Doris drove the car on such a date to a roadh
a careful dr~ver. In March, 1962
but Doris drank soft drinks Afterwards Do iouse, ~~~r? Pete drank several beer~
.
uz·1 nng them to
'
Pr 1nce
W1.lliam County, while• Pete dozed ' As r Dos was
.
ward s h er home in
intersection, she mistakenly stepped on.the ac~~~e~~:~~d to slow down to turn an
car went out of control, struck a light pole and Pet r ~nstead of the brake, the
Pete sued Doris in the proper Virginia coU:.t
~ w.u injured•
and th~ abaTe fac~ were proved without disput; ::etheg damages for his inj~iea,
the ev1.dence, Dons mov~.Q. the court to strike Pete'• e trial. At the c~nclus 1 on of
facts proved did not constitute actionable ne l.
vidence, contending(l)that the
d Do .
.
g l.gence on her part
d(2)th
an
rl.B were jo1.nt venturera at the time of the accid
' an
at Pete
rule on each of Doris • contentions?
ent • How should the court
~TORTS) Neither or Doris' ~o~tentioM is correct. A man
1n his own car so Doris owed Pete a duty ot ordina.r
cannot be a gratuitous guest
negligence. It is at least a jury question as to wh!~:eo~nd is liable for Ordinary
Since Doris did not have an equal right to control the e
not Doris vas negligent.
venture or a.joint enterprise, and even if it were sh ar it wa~ not a joint
negligently injured another party engaged in the '
je would Still be liable if ~h"'
Fed. Su.pp. 143.
- same oint enterprise. See 170

.<1. >-'
Painter drove his truck north on Main Street in the town of Gaston, Va. On the
side of the truck opposite the driver's side, Painter had tied a ladder thirty feet
long. A town ordinance made it a miademeanor to carry on the side of any vehicle
a ladder which protruded beyond either bumper of the vehicle. As Painter passed
through the interaection of Main and Eastern Streets, an automobile traveling east
on Eastern Street struck the ladder where it protruded ten feet behind Painter's
truck. The impact threw the ladder against the plate glass window of a store on the
corner of the intersection, and Innocent, a customer inside the store, was injured
by the broken glass.
In an action for damages by Innocent against Painter, the above facts were proven.
At the conclusion of the evidence, Painter requested the court to instruct the jury
that even if they believed he was guilty of negligence which Jll"OXimately caused the
accident, they should neYertheless return a verdict in his favor if they further
believed that the injuries to Innocent were not reasonably foreseeable by him.
Should the court so instruct the jury?
(TC?RTS) The instruetion should not be given. It is self contl'adictory because
Pa4nter could not be guilty of negligence proximately causing the accident if there
was no element or foreseeability. It is sufficient to foresee that some one in the
zone of possible danger might be injured even th011gh the ex.aot manner· of injury
might not have been reasonably foreseeable.
·•
·
9~

-<'& .YJones was sitting on the front porch o! his home on Elm Street in Culpeper,
lOvla

a moYing van slowly passed by his house, and Jones noticed its driver looking at
each house aa if searching for a part.ioular number. Suddenly, the van stopped, and
without blowing his horn or otherwise signaling, or looking, the driver backed up
rapidly .. A three-year old child was just then crossing the street behind the nn,
and startled by the backing vehicle the child stwnbled and fell down in ita path.
Jones, seeing the child • s peril, darted from the porch toward the child and wu
S\lOCesstul in pushing him out of the truck's path, but Jones himself was etruiDk by
the tail gate and painfully injured.
Jones sued the truck driver at law for damages in tha p~per court. At the trial
the above facta were proved, and at the conclusion of the evidence the drinr moved
the court to strike Jonee' evidence on the ground that Jones was guilt)' of oontributory negligence ae a matter of law.
How should the court rule?
(TORTS) Jones 18 not guilt)' of 'contributory negligence as a matter of law. He exercised that amount of care that an ordinary prudent courageous man would exercise.
There was an emergency caused by defendant's negligence and Jones had oo time to
make nice est;Lmates. "Danger invites rescue• and defeu:lant created the danger.

•

8'f'J ohn Lord was the owner of a warehouse in the City of Newport News. The warehouse
was quite old and badly in need of repair. On Jan.2,1963 Lord leased the building to
Ben Tate for a term of four years at a low rental. A provision of the lease obligated Tate to place the building in safe condition by repairs to be made within a
period of three months. On April lOth Lord visited the build:i..ng and, seeing that
Tate had not made the repairs required of him, stated that he must do so within the
next thirty days or face evietion. Tate promised faithfully to make the repairs.
However, by May 26th no repairs had been made and on that day while Frank Jones was
carefully driving his automob~ . le in a public alley alongside the building a cornice
of the building broke loose fell upon the automobile, and seriously injured Jones.
Jones now consults you, r~citing the foregoing facts. He inquires what rights of
action, if any, he might have (a)agai nst Lord, and (b) agains t Tate.
vlliat should your advice be?
(TORTS) Both are liable as joint tortfeasors. Lord ha.s leased premises that were in
a dangerous state of disrepair and he cannot escape liability
third ·parties
rightfully on the highways by trying to get Tate to make the r epairs. Tate is liable
because he i s negligently continuing a public nui sance, See #80 of Prosser on Torts
(2 d Ed.).
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91f.:i'e rry, an infant patient in Disabled. Children's Hospital, a charitable corporation
of Bedford, was fatally burned due to the negligence of a night nurse who was an
employee. Frank Walton, the father of Jerry, upon hearing of the fatality raced to
the hospital late at night, and on entering the hospital fell into an unlighted
elevator shaft and suffered serious personal injuries •
Shortly thereafter, Walton filed two motions for judgment in the Circuit Court of
Bedford County against the Hospital. The first, as Administrator of Jerry lvalton,
was for his wrongful death, and the second was for his own personal injuries caused
by falling into the elevator shaft.
In each case, the Hospital filed identical defenses, viz. that the Hospital was a
charitable institution and was not liable for the negligence of its employees.
In both trials, the uncontradicted ev:!.dence showed that the Hospital had exercised
due care in the selection and retention of its employees, but in each instance there
was clear evidence that due care had not been exercised by the defendant's employees.
In each case, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.
'rhe attorney for t.he defendant Hospital has moved to set aside each verdict on the
ground of charitable immunity.
How should the court rule on the motion to set aside (l)in the action for wrongful
death of Jerry Walton; and (2) in the action for the personal injuries to James
vlalton?
(TORTS)(l)The motion to set aside the verdict for damages for the death of Jerry
Walton should be granted. He was the recipient of the charity and . tp~ defendant has
the charitable immunity from suit in Virginia when sued by a persoii»ty a privy of
such person who is the beneficiary of the charityo
.~~.
~ ...: J 1ne rnu~:..Lun "(,O set. as~de 'the verdict for the injury to the father would be
cenied. He was not the beneficiary of the charity. The Hospital owed him at least a
dut.y t,o warn of the danger even if he were only a licensee.
Virginia cases in point are 131 Va.587; 187 Va.5; 200 Va.878.
10.16gi.ll Careless operated his truck in a westerly direction on Route 7 in Clarke
County. Noticing a friend plowing corn in a field to his right, Caraless parked his
truck with the left wheels standing on the traveled portion of the west-bound l ane,
and walked into the field to converse with his friend.
John Bull, while traveling in a westerly direction on the same road and when he
was approximately 500 feet to the rear of the parked truck, observed the approach
of an automobile traveling in an easterly direction and operated by Sally Prudence.
As Bull approached the parked truck he applied his brakes, but as they were not in
proper adjustment, a fact known to Bull, he was unable to bring his car to a stop.
Although Bull reduced his speed, his autom~bile swerved slightly to the left and
struck the corner of the parked truck. Losing control of his car, Bull's vehicle
collided wlth the a.utomobil.e driven by Sally Prudence at a point 100 feet west of
the parked truck. Sally l~udence was injured ar.d sued both Careless and Bull in the
same action to recover damages.
In the trial of the action the foregoing facts were proved by Sally Prudence.
When the plaintiff rested her case, each defendant moved the court to strike
plaintiff's evidence. How should the court rule on eaeh motion1
(TORTS) The evidence should be stricken as to Careless, but not as to Bull. The sole
proximate cause of the accid<mt was the later negligence of Bull. Careless is not
required to anticipate that o~hers will drive cars with def ective brakes. In 173 Va.
448 it is said, "Where a seconti t ort--feasor becomes aware, or by the exercise of
ordinary care should be aware, of the existE:nce of a potential danger created by the
nealigence of an original tort···feasor , and thereafter by an independent act of
ne~ligence brings about an accident, the condition created by the first tort-feasor
becomes merely a circumstance of the accident, but is not a proximate cause thereof.
The original negligence of the first tort-feasor is legally insulated by the intervening independent negligence of the second tort-feasor, and the latter becomes the
sole proximate cause of the accident."
Note: Considerable credit probably will be given for an answer that states that
the evidence should not be stricken as to either, for it is at least a jury question,
or for a well reasoned argument contrab ouch as Bull's having bad brakes was antecedent negli gence, and hence that he did not thereafter bring about the accident
by a new act of negligence.

7 .bf~ the early morning hours of February 12, 1963, Albert 11uffett of the City of
Fredericksburg finished playing poker with some close friends and got in his automobile to hurry home. A heavy snow had fallen and, although it had been cleaned from
the streets, remained on the branches of overhanging tree limbs. As 11uffett neared
his home a heavy limb broke from one of the tr ees, fell across the top of Muffett's
automobile, and caused a slight cut across his forehead. He was not otherwise injured. Unable to extricate himself from the automobile, Muff ett remained in the car
until 6:30 o'clock in the morning when a passerby discovered him and drove him
toward the hospital. However, on the way to the h0spi.tal Muffett died as a r esult of
profuse bleeding from the cut across his forehead. Thereafter the Administrator of
Maffett's estate brought an action against the City of Fredericksburg asking damages
of $35,000 for the wrongful death of Nuffett. On the trial of the case evidence
showed that the limb which f ell upon Muffett 1 s car was old and rotten, and that this
had been know~ : to the City for many months prior to the accident; that Muffett had
been driving prior to, and at the time of, the accident 20 miles per hour in excess
of the speed limit; that Muffett was affl:i.cted with the rare and hereditary disease
of hemophilia which prevents cessation of bleeding; and that had he not been so
afflicted he wculd not have died. When both par ties had rested, the City, conceding
its own negligence, moved the Court to strike the plai nti ff's evidence on the
following grounds:
!

\J'-' ...... •

(a) that Muffett's car would not have been struck by the falling limb had he been
driving from the poker game to. his home at a lawful rate of speed, and
(b) that the City could not be held liable for the vrrongful death of Muffett in
that it could not be charged with a duty to foresee that the fallen limb would injur
a person suffering from such a rare and hereditary disease.
How should the Court rule on each ground of the motion?
(TORTS) Neither ground is valid.(a )Muffett 1 s negligence in speeding was not the
cause of the limb falling on him. If he had driven evenfaster, he would likewise
have escaped injury. It was just a coincident circumstance or condition that Muffett
happened to be there at that time. See 43 A.240; Prosser on Torts,(2d Ed.) p.286.
{b) A manwith a disability is not an outlaw and is entitled to recover the damages
he has suffered as a result of defendant's negligence even if they were not complete·
foreseeable. Prosser on Torts,(2d Ed.) p.260.
l>b"7
8 Y On the aft ernoon of November 14, 1963, Jack Holmes drove through a stop sign
while coming out of a side street into Main Street in the City of Lynchburg and
crashed into an automobile driven by Robert Charles. Holmes lost consciousness as
his car careened across Main Street and came to a stop in its west bound lane. At
the time of the collis ion, William Stock was deiving his automobile along Main
Street in a westerly direction approximately 500 feet east of the place of the
accident. Stock who had seen the accident occur, and who thought he could pass by
it safely by driving to his left and passing between the automobiles of Holmes and
Charles, continued driving along Main Street. However, when attempting to pass
between the vehicles of Holmes and Charles, he found the s pace too narrow and
collided with the rear of Holmes' automobile. That collision caused serious personal
injuries to Holmes who has now brought an action against Stock in the Corporation
Court of the City of Lynchburg to recover damages for those injuries.
Stock now consults you, and asks your advice on whether he has a good defense to
the action. What should your advice be?
{TORTS) No. Holmes' negligence had completely spent itself at the time of Stock's
collision with him, and hence was not a proximate cause of the collision with Stock.
Besides Stock had a last clear chance of_avoiding the accident, but instead of so
doing, failed to use due care when he attempted to drive through the nar:ow space
between the two cars. 11 Where the injured person has negligently placed h1mself in a
situation of peril from which he is physically unable to remove himself, the defendant is liable if he saw, or should have seen, him in time to avert the accident by
using reasonable care." 197 Va.233 at p.2}8.
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holesaler in pickles contracted with Super~ntMa! oft~ ~elicit 1b8 b~r:ls of grade A dill pickles, delivery to be made on

9.

~~a:b:: ~:·1963.

•

During the fall of 1963, there was a shortage of good qualit~ dill
·
nd
h
1
p ckles, a
sue could be then purchased from wholesalers only at advanced
h tpr1ces.
·
1 o tober Burch growing ,short of his dill pickle supply, but knowing t a h1s
o~d ~riend'Frank ~arks who ran a small grocery chain in the City of Richmond was
A
sore 1y i n need Of such pickles , voluntarily offered. to sell 120 barrels of grade
•
dill pickles to Parks at a low price. Although knoW1ng of Burch 1 s contract W1th
Super-Mar ke ts , Inc • and that the purchase from Burch would exhaust all
· Burch's d
1 Parks nevertheless accepted the proposal of Burch and paid h1m the agree
s~i~ey~n delivery of the dill pickles. On November 1st, Burch being unable to make
·
to Super - Markets ' Inc. , the latter purchased
of grade A dill
p 11very
de
.
• 100 barrels
.
pickles from another source paying therefor a pr1ce $1,000 1n excess of that contracted for by Burch.
Super-Markets, Inc. now consults you and inquires whether it has a cause of
ction against Parks. What should you advise?
aTORTS) It has not. Title to the pickles had not passed to Super-Markets. Burch
(
8 t•ll buy other pickles on the market. Parks has not actively sought to injure
can M
~ar k e ts • See Torts Restatement #766
·
• 11y th e ~
· 11us t rat ~on
·
·
in
and espec~a
g~ven
SuperComment i thereto.
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Parks sued Bill
in the Circuit Court cf Gocchland County, Va., to recover damages for personal injtU"ie;3 resulting f:com an ~utcmobile collision. At the
trial of the case the evidence established the ·~allowing facts: The collision of
the automobiles occurred at nighttime; Dozer was operating his car. with his headlights on high beam; no other traffic >-ras approaching from the direction in which
Dozer was traveling; Dozer had been driYing for t-welve hours without rest and was
sleepy; Parks, who had been traveling in the same direc tion as Dozer, had stopped
his car in Dozer 's lane of traffic to talk to a friend of his who was standing by the
roadrJide and while thus parked he turned on his parking lights, but due to faulty
wiring the taillights on his car were not bu:-ning.; Parks ' car was black in color and
the night was very dark and there was some fog; for a very brief r.1oment before
Parks r car came rr.i. thin tbe range of Doz erf s headlights, Dozer noddccl t<!ith sleep and
w!-len he awoke his car was approxim.:ltely two CaT lengths behind Parks' car; Parks• car
would have been observable within the r·nnge of D..-,:;arts headJ.:i.gl'lt~ when the Dozer car
was six lengths behind Parks' ~~r;stcu·tJ.ed by the sudden appearance of Parks' car in
his lane of traffic, Dozer foreitly applied the br akes of his car which was then
traveling at the J.a;ttful speed of 55 rdles per hour, but he wus unable to bring his
car to a stop before it struck the rear of Parks' car; Dozer, in tha exercise of
ordinary.car~, could ~ave avoi~ed strik~ng the rear of P~·ks' car had he, immediately
upon see~ng ~t: cut h1s car to the left, but because of h~s alarm and the brief
moment for acti on he elect.ed to attempt. to avoid the coll:i.sion by applying his brakes
At the conclusion of the evidence the Court overruled Dozer's motion to strike the
plaintiff's evidence, ~-Thereupon Doz 3r requested the Court to give an instruction on
sudden emergency. Sho,lld the L1struction be given?
(TORTS ) No. Dozer is not entitled to such an instruction because the sudden emergenoy
was due to his own fault. See 197 Va~240.
9 fb/In the trial of an aG~ion. for. fraud and deceit, commenr~ ed by John Sawyer against
sfephen Forester, the folloWlng facts were proved:Sawyer operated a sawmill and was
engaged in the manufacture of lwnber; Forester called upon Sawyer at the latter's
home in Roanoke, and offered to sell to him a tract of pine timber, aituat.ed in
Stafford County, Va.; Sawyer told ForcG ter that he was only interested in making
purchases of timber tracts that would produce not less than 3,ooo,ooo baard feet of
high quality pine lmnbf'Jr; thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, "I have owned this
tract for 10 years, I have been over it many times,

c:.nd j_t is my op~m.on that tW.s tract of timher will cut 3,250,000 board feet of
beD.nti ful pine lwnber, the highest quality'~; Sawyer kne·w that Forester had bought
and sold ti~ber t~acts for more than 20 years and that Forester had bean employed
f or many years by different lumber companies to cruise timber tracts and to advite
thorn upon the quality of timber; Saviyer told Forester that he was leaving the next
day for a t.:-:Lp West am that he would not return for 2 months and because he would
not have a chance to examine the timber he was not interested in purchaslng it;
thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, nr am anxious to sell this tract of' timber immediately and I know it is what you want, and I repeat that it is my opinion that
you cannot find better quality pine and I am also of the opinion that this t:cact will
cut out at least 3,250,000 board : feettt; Sawyer then said to Forester, "I know you
have ha.d a lot of experience and I accept your st.a.tement regarding the quality and
quantity of the timber, and I am willing to buy your tract of timber and pay you the
r-um of $19$5oon; the written l!.ontract of sale and purchase, hereafter set out, Wets
then signsd by the parties; during Sawyer's absence his employees, at his direction,
cut and removed the entire tract of t:L-nber and Sc:.wyer J.ee.x-nro upon his return the
tract prcd.uced only l.llOOO,OOO board feet of lumber; unbeknown to Sawyer, Forester
had never cruised t.h'3 timber tract but he belived that the tract actually did contain
J,2.50,000 board feet of timber; and plaintiff introduced in evidence the following
written contract:
'!I, Stephen Fores·cer, do hereby sell to Joi"'..n Sawyer the entire tract of pine
timber, situated on my Pine 'I'op Farm, Staf ford Co1mty, Va., and John Sawyer
does herawith agree to pay for said tra\)t of timber upon the signing of this
contract the sum of $19,500,
"Witness the following signatures and seals:
11 /a/ Stephen Forester
(Seal)
2/s/ John Sawyer
(Seal)n
After all of the evidence had been introduced defe~dant. movod to strike plaintiff's
evj.dence and that sunnnary judgmen·~ be entered fer defenG.ant. How should the Court
rule?
{TORTS) Either of two answer.:;: (1) The motion ohould be grant.sd... Forrester only
expressed a~ opinion. If SavJyer wanted to protect himself he uould easily have done
s o by requiring a 1"arranty of quantity . The parti es were on equal terms. There is
no evidence that Forester lied about his opinion, or (2) The moti on should be overruled. It is at least a jury question as to whether or not Forester really had such
an opinion. It is most unlikely that an e~cperienced timb'3::- cruiser could make such
a gross mistake. If Forester misrepresl3nted his opinion, and his op~n~on was
material, c:.s here, he has misrepresen~ed a fact. The opinion was meant to be relied
upon and was justifiably relied upon.
See 199 Va.l8 and Prosser and Torts ##89 and 90 ~
lo ?'"'J immy Underpass, 17 years of a.ge, inv·it0cl Tor.nny Childres ~' ;. 13 ~ears of ag?, to
r ide with him on his single-seated motoTeycle ¢ Ci!ildress seated h~self astrlde the
gas tank, between th 6 ~eat and the handlebars, and Unde2·pas e occu.p~ed the only seat
on the motorcycle .. While proceGding c;.long a street in the City of Lynchburg, Va,,
the motorcycle collided at an ir.terso.:; tion with another vehicle and Childress was
seriously injured~ A City Ordinan~e mada it. unlawful for tho op~rator of a m~tor
cycle to car ry more persons than there are seats available, and 1.~ also made 1.t
unlawful for any pers on to ride or be tranDported upon such a veh~cle unless occupyi ng a regular s eat. A viola tion of t his or dina nce 1v-ould result in the imposition
of a f ine • . Childress, by his next friend, sued Underpass to recover damages for
personal injuries. During the t r lal of the case defendant requested and the Court
gave an instruction telling the j t~y that Childress was guilty of negl~gence ~ ~e
i n violating tile ordinancd, and if suc h negligeme Mnstit.uted a contnbuting proximate cause of the collision plaintiff could not re~over. The jury returned a verdict
for the defendant and upon a motion to set aside the verdi,~t plai ntiff contended that
the Court committed error in in:.;truct.ing the jury that plaintj_ff' s violati on of the
ordinanc e constituted negli genc e per e e ~
How should the Court rule -· on th"Etmoti on to set aaide the verdict'?
~:Cf~TS ) '~h? motion Dhould be granted. In Virginia t hl;'re is a rebuttnble prnsu:m.pti on
nat a c hll d over 7 ar.d under 11. is inca pabl e of be ing contribut orily noglig':mt
vmc:the: hi s conduct is to he tested on common law p:;:J.~ciples or in view o:f a statute,
or or~l~an~ e. He nce it was e~ror to instrur.t the jury that plaintiffs violation of
the or dl.nano..;e constituted negligence per se. 197 Va .572.
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O·v s, now1.ng t.. al'_. ,lyde had worked ~or demolition firms for about a year as a

laborer, contracyacl w1.th Clyde to d r:m10l1.sh two buildings on Otis'
t
contract provided that for $2,500 Clyde would furnish aJl labor
prho~er Y• The
· 1 ·
·
·
· .
·
, mac 1nery, and
matena., 1nc 1ud1.ng ~xplosive s ~ and would be responaible !or all details to
accomphsh the d emoht1on i? s1.xt.y days. BE::t~ause of the slowness of the liOrk Cl
obtai?ed a crane, ?ever hc-~·nng _ us~d one before;> and while using the crane and'
yde
blast:wg some fGOt:i.ngs, one bulldlng w2.s caused to fall and damage the ad ·0 • •
building of Neighbors.
J lnJ..ng
In an action by NeighborJ against Otis and Clyder it 1.vas shown that th
k
. th
t
·
•
···
-~h
·
e
wor
do n e _pursuanft .vO
.e ~on r ave, vJl.v no dlre(~tJ..On and cont:::-ol by Otis, and that was
the
1
neg 1.~ence o . Clyde, J.n fact~ ~ausF.:d the damage. Is Otis liable to Neighbors?
(TORTS) Yes under three pcss1.ble tbeorit)s. (1) Otis himse lf ha"' be
.
1·
letting a mere lbaborer handle hea:vy maehinery a nd explosiv 8 s ~r( 2 e)2"' ? eg_J..gen~ 1?
.
t
d.
. 1 1'
• , ,
vvul e a prJ.ncJ..pa1 t ~3 no . o~ 1.nar1 y 1a~le for the torts of his independent contractor an exce~(~o)? ~1s s _wh~r~ - tht: 1.ndependent eon~-ractor ~s engaged in extra-hazardous work
01
1n ~orne JUrls 1.C 1.ons one engages 1.n tmch 1cl1erently dangerous work at his '

1

!'E::-il··- ·Le, he is absolutely liable for darnnges caused, and one cannot escape such
lia bility by getting some one else to do the job for him8
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had the gasoline tank on his alltomobile filled with gasoline at the Heek
Oil Co o After traveling two miles, his engine quit, and he stopped his automobile
t.·pp0site Pristine Gas Company stationo Attentive, an employee of Pristine,
diagnosed the trollble as water in the gasoline and, at Sport's insistence, agreed t o
drain t he eighteen--gallon automobile tank by using a six- gallon tire-tes-ting tank.
When it vJaB apparent that the gasoline ,,J as draining very slowly, Sp:.>rt bec.ame hnpatient and increasingly angry and insisted on going back to Meek Oil Co. to P.'.a.!ce
complaint. After repeated urging, Attentive took Sport back to Meek Oil Co • .1 and
Sport learned that Meek, in fact, had negligently allmved Ha tcr to mix with the
gasoline. While they were gone the ree;.eptacle into which the gasoline was draining
overflowed, and a passerby, Curious, v1ondered aloud if it was water or gasoline
that was in the gutt er and to fitld out threw a lighted match in i t with the :;,·esult
that S pol~ t s automobile was destroyed by fire.
Sport brought an v.Gtion for damages against Meek Oil Co. fo r the loss of his
automobile. I::J Sport entitled to a rec overy?
(TORTS) No. The act of Meek Oil Co. was not the proximate cause of the loss as there
was an efficient intervenine ar.t of another pa~ty or parties not reasonably foreseeable by Meek Oil Co. Bes ides Spcrt 1.ras h:l.msdf negligent in not thinking of the
draining operation 1-1hen he wa s ::;o i r•.J i s t o-cnt that he be taken to Meek Oil Co .,
See 171 Vao62, 197 S.E . I.~-68 c,n_ p ... l 020 of the Tor.t Case s i n the se ~· Notes.

2 June Exam 1965.
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'7. The We-Rent-Urn Corporation was in the bilsiness of renti.ng a utomobiles to be dri·Je:.l
ty ths person to whom the car vras :!.eased. Smith rented a car from this corpon :c:i.or1
and while using it. struck and seriously inju:ced Pedestrian. The particular car j_i1"·
'Valved had been driven several years and its brakes had become defective, due to
which cau::;e Smith was unable to control i t properly and had run a red light at a
crossing where Pedestrian had the right of way. Pedestrian sued the T~Te-Rent x,Um
Corporation alleging, that i f it had made a reasonable inspection of the automobile
before its rental the defect would he.ve been discovered, and that such insp0cn;ion
was not made~ Assuming that the proof sustained these allegations, is the corpora··
tion liable to fedestrian for his injuries?
(TORTS) Yes. Such injuries could be reasonably foreseen. Pros s er on Torts (3rd Ed .. )
PP• 685-686 reads, "The lessor of an automobile, or any other bailor .for hire, is
liable to a guest in the vehicle, or a person run down by i t on the highway, not onl:r
if he knows that the car is dangerously defective at the time he turns it over, or
that the person entrusted with it is incompetent to handle it, but also if he merely
fails to make reasonable inspection to discover possible defects before turning it
ov-er. 11
~<
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8 .Crumbley owned a large farm, part of which lay betvreen the highway and Lake Beaut:!.ful. Fo~tunate owned a handsome residence on the other side of the hi ghway.
Fortunate's front porch commanded an at·t;rac t i.ve view across Crumbley 's pasture field
to the lake beyond. Crumbley became angry at F0rt.unate over a business transaction,
and while he needed a new da.::!.r y barn and there wer e several other sui table l ocations
for it, he built it in his pasture directly in front of Fortunate's residence,
cutting off the view of the l ;,'.lce and seriously deprBciating the value of the residenee, remarking to his contracto r·, "I guess thi s v:ill teach that stu~kup dude that
I can get even with him. 11
Fortunate sued C:rumbley for damages to his property allegi.ne that the barn was
placed on its present ]ocation out of spitu and malice, and t hat his property was
damaged by at least ~~10,000. Assume the eYidence establis hed the above facts, is
Fortunate entitled to recover damages?
(TORTS) Fortunate is not entitled to dama.ges. Crumbley was privileged t o build a
barn on his own land . If the barn als o se1~ved a useful purpose i t is not a private
nuisance and it is immaterial that there was a s pite motive also. Fortunate is not
entitled to an easement of view over Crumbley' s land unless t he lat ter grants such
a n easement to him. See Prosser on Tor~.s (3rd Ed.) P.619, note 19~
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9 2'Thom, whi le motoring on a pleasure trip~ negligently struck Pedestrian in Roanoke,
breaking both his l egs . w"hiJe Pedestrian was lying helples s in the roadway, jonGs ,
not keeping an adequate loolcouJ0, ran over and broke Pedeat.:!.'ian ' s armo
What is the extent of liability, if any , for the injuries sust ained ,(a) with
res pect to Thorn, and (b) with respect to J ones?
(TOH.TS) Thorn is liable for both injuries. Jones i s liabl e onJ y for the broken arm.
P.co8ser on Torts (2nd Ed.) p o2 30 r eads in part. as follovJS~ " I£' an automobile negligently driven by d efendant A strike3 the plaintiff , frac tLtres his skull, and leaves
him helpless on the hi. gh~ray, where shortly afte rward a second automobile, negligently driven by defend ::mt B, run3 over him and br"eaks hi s leg, A will be Hable for
both injuries , for when the plaintiff was left i n the highway , it was r easonably to
be a nticipated that a second car 'tvould r un him down. But. defendant B should be
liable only for the br oken leg, sin,;e he hac'l no part in causing the fractured skull,
1
a nd could
,... not foresee or avoid i t! '
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and Bill unemancipated infant brothers, residing in the same household, were
dating their r~spective girl friends, Martha and Barbara. Al drove them to a DriveIn movie in his 1965 Plymouth sedano On their way home, all occupants of the car
were injured vJhen Bill, while driving Al's car, lost control of it and struck a
telephone pole in Bath County, Va. No other vehicle was involved •
Separate personal injury actions were brought on behalf of Al, Martha and Barbara
against Bill in the Circuit Court of Bath County.
What degree of negligence on the part of Bill must Al, Martha and Barbara each
prove in order to recover?
(TORTS) Al need prove only ordinary neglig~nce. He cannot be a guest.in his own car.
The two young ladies must prove gross negl1gence as they were non-paY1ng passenger
guests of Al and/or his .c_~J.auffeur, Bill. 1rJhile it is ~rguab~e tha~ Al 1 s dat~ was not
Bill's guest the l;>etter v1ew would seem to be that thJ.s entJ.re tr1p was soc1al
rather than business and hence the girls should be treated as if they were non-paying
guests whether Bill or Al is the one who is driving.

9 }) ~fnes while operating a truck in the scope of his employment by Smith, was involved i~ an accident in the City of Richmond with an automobile being driven by
Thomas. The truck was owned by Smith, and he was a passenger in it at the time of
the accident. Both Smith and Thomas suffered injuries proximately caused by the
accident.
Smith brought a joing action against Jones and Thomas for his personal inju;:iGs,
and Thomas brought a similar action against Smith and Jones. Both actions ·Here
l::rought in the appropriate Richmond court.
Assuming that the evidence showed that Jones was guilty of gross negligence,
lJhile Thomas was guilty of only simple negligence, but that the conduct of bot.h
proximately cor..tributed to cause the accident. (A) May Smith recover agains ·~ either
Jones or Thomas? (B) M~y Thomas recover against either Jones or Smith?
(TORTS)(A) S.<·nith may recover from his servant, Jones but not against Thomas. Jones
violated a duty he owEd his employer when he drove negligently. Jones' negligence
is imputed to Smith in Smith's action against Thomas and constitutes a bar to any
recovery.
(B) No. Thomas' negligence bars any action he might otherwise have.
/

lo£16i.terbert Homeowner undertook to revamp the exterior of his home. He decided t o
do the paint job himself, but for a needed replacement of s ome of the slate on his
roof he s ecur ed an independent roofing contractor to join in the undertaking on a
cost basis.
Roy Roofrunner, an employee of the roofing contractor, arrived at Homeowner's
house to do the roof work. He found there a large scaffold extending from the
ground to the top of the house , a.nd which had been recently constructed by Homeowner, who was temporarily away f~om the premises~ Already on the scaffold was
Yorrick Yardman, a neighoor 7 s serva.nt, who had found the scaffold a handy means of
taking advantage of his permission 'of long standing to eather apples from Homeowner's tree, n~ct to which the scaffold now stoo~.
Perceiving that this scaffold was the only access to the roof, Roofrunner proceeded up it immediately to start his work. At this point the scaffold collapsed as
a r esult of its neglig0nt construction by Homeowner, injuring both of its occupants.
Is Homeowner liable in damages for the injuries sus~aine d by (A) Roofrunner, and
(B) Yardman?
(TO RTS) (a) Homeowner is liable to Roofrunner who ~ms a business visitor. He owed a
duty to him to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Roofrunner was
impliedly invited to use the scaffolding. (b) Homeovmer is not liable to Yardman
who was a bare licensee. He owed Yardman no duty of prevtsi on. Yardman took the
premises as he found them. The scaffold was built for Roofrunner--not for Yardman •

7.~ne evening James Dove and his wire Shirley, intending to visit their friends Mr.

and Mrs. Bates, mistakenly went to the wrong residence and knocked on the front door.
The door was opened by Andy Gwnp, who was owner of the residence and the operator of
a neighborhood confectionary. When ·he saw James Dove he became livid with anger and
said, "You are the customer I saw steal $10 from my cash register this afternoon
and run from my store before I could catch you." Thereupon Gump seized Dove, dragged
him into the hallway, struck him across the face and forced him into the hallway
closet, locking the door. He then c~;tled through the door to Dove cmd said, "You
are going to stay in that closet until you either return my money or tell me where
you have hidden it.tt With that Shirl~y Dove ran screaming from the house in search
of a policeman. Although Dove protested to Gump his innocence, Gump refused to
release him. After having been locked in the closet approximately twenty minutes,
Dove succeeded in breaking open the door, running past Gump, and making his esc3no ~
Dove now consults you and asks that you advise him of what cause or causefj of action
he has against gwnp.
Assuming Dove innocent of the charges made against him by Gwnp, how should you
advise him?
(TORTS) Slander, insulting words, assault and battery, false imprisonment.

e~aam Grew was driving his Volkswagen with his wife as a passenger in the bu'3i!l~V5S

section of the City of Richmond. While driving at a high rate of speed.!' Gr ~lW ·t.n:..~:-~tnd
to the left from Main Street on to Eighth Street and the vehicle ,_,t ert:J.rned. P.c!.~n
Grew was rendered unconscious. Although Mrs. Grew was throvm out of the V0lkmm.r_s'.m,
it fell heavily on the lower part of her body and pinned her beneath it. H:cs. Gj~ew
at once began to scream from the extreme pain she was suffering, and Thonms Keene
rushed from the sidewalk and with great effort raised the vehicle sufficiently to
permit Mrs. Grew to crawl free. Because of his efforts in aiding Mrs. Grew, K~ne
suffered torn muscles in his back and was bedridden for approximately six weeks.
Thereafter, Keene sued Adam Grew in the Law and Equity Court of the City of
Richmond for $6 1 000 damages charging Grew with negligence proximately causing Keene's
injuries. In his grounds of defense, Grew alleged Keene had assumed the risk and was
guilty of contributory negligence. During the trial, and while Keene was on the
witness stand, counsel for Grew asked him, "How old are you?tt Keene answered, "I am
68". Grew's counsel then asked, . "Didn 1 t you realize that you ran considerable risk
of injury to yourself in lifting that Volkswagen off of Mrs. Grew?u Keene replied,
Yes. I knew that ij was a dangerous thing for me to do, but I felt I had to do something to help Mrs. Grew." Shortly thereafter Keene rested his case, and counsel for
Grew moved the Court to strike Keene's evidence o~the ground that the latter's
testimony showed him to have assumed the risk and to be guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. How should the Court rule?
(TORTS) It is at least a jury question as to whether Keene assumed the risk and
therefore Grew's motion should be denied. The general rule is that one who ~~as a
pereon in imminent and serious peril caused by the negligence of another cannot be
charged with contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life
or serious injury in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not
recklessly or rashly made. 2 Restatement of Torts #472; Andttews, 192 Va. 150;
wright, 110 Va. 670; Southern, 114 Va. 723.

9~~le Alfred Romeo was 500 feet away from, and driving in a westerly direction
toward, a two lane bridge suspended over the Dan River in Halifax County, he saw
Thomas MacBeth standing against the railing of the bridge and fishing from its
right side. At the same time, Romeo saw distantly approaching in the eastbound lane
an automobile being driven by Goeffry Hamlet. Romeo did not slacken his speed and,
to avoid Macbeth, on nearing him Romeo swung his automobile into the eastbound lane
of traffio. Before he could return to the westbound lane, the left front portion
of his automobile collided with the left fran portion of that being driven by
Hamlet. As a result of the collision, Hamlet suffered severe injuries. Shortly
thereafter, Hamlet brought an action against both Romeo and Macbeth in the Circuit
Court of Halifax County charging each with negligence contributing to his injuries.
Neither Romeo nor Macbeth charged Hamlet with contributory negligence. During the

•
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trial, the foregoing facts were proven. After all evidence was in, Hamlet offered
several instructions to the Court, one of which read as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that an ordinance of Halifax County makes
it a misdemeanor for any person to fish from a bridge over which there
is vehicular traffic. A~cordingly, should you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the 'defendant Macbeth was fishing from the
bridge at the time of the accident involved in this case, that in so
doing he caused the defendant Romeo to swerve his automobile i!!to the
eastbound land, and that this contributed to the collision between
the vehicle of the defendant Romeo and that of the plaintiff Hamlet,
then you should find bhe defendant Macbeth guilty of negligence and
return your verdict against him and for the plaintiff Hamlet.n
Counsel for Macbeth conceded that this instruction correctly recited the ordinance
of Halifax County, but objected to the giving of the instruction assigning grounds
therefor. Should this objection have been sustained?
(TORTS) Instruction is incorrect as the negligence of Romeo intervened and insulated
the negligence of Macbeth. Hubbard, 173 Va.448, at PP• 455 & 456.

TORTS 12 ~f>
1. on Saturday afternoon, at 2:30 o'clock, Rose Gardner entered the selfservice store of Cash & Carry Grocery, Inc., in a ommunity shopping center1
in virginia, for the purpose of doing her week ly shopping. The shelves
upon which the articles of merchandise were placed were arranged to serve
the onvenience of the customers, the bottom shelves standing a short distance above the floor. While reaching to a top shelf to obtain an article
of merchandise, Rose Gardner placed her right foot three or four inches
under the bottome shelf and \olh e n she turned to move away she slipped and
fell to the floor severely injuring her knee. After arising from the floor
she noticed a small dark object about an inch and a half long at one end
of a skid mark on the floor about six inches in l Pngth. Upon examining
the object it was determined to be a small onion which\vas discolored.
The manager of th e store was promptly notified and upon investigation he
saw th e skid mark, the discolored onion, and observed that Rose Gardner
ltad a great amount of swelling in he r l ~nee. Shortly the reafter Rose Gardner
sued ~~eh &Carry Grocery, Inc. to r ecover damages for her injuri es . During
the course of the trial plaintiff proved the foregoing facts" Hhereupon,
the defendant proved thc t the floors of the store were swept clean every
ev~ ning after closin~ and every morning early, as a matter of routine,
and that they were swept at other times when the manage r thought it
nece ssa ry. The de fendant alro proved that the floors had been swept clean
on the mornin~ the plaintiff slipped and fell. The jury returne d a verdict
for the plaintiff anJ defe ndant made a motion to set aside the verdict
and enter judgment for the defendant.
How should tte Court rule on the motion to set aside the verdict and
enter judgment for th e defendant?
There was no evidence of TlP. gl igence on the p art of the store and the
court should set aside the verdict and ente r final judeme nt for the defendant
Rose would have the burden of showine; that the onion was a hazard and that
•
the defe ndant r e asonably should have known about its ;'rcsence. The contention
that the onion had been on the floor a long time i s based on its dar k color
is mere ijP@CUi?<t1tm. Juries should not be allowed to speculate on such
matters ••• 208 Va 913.

•

TORTS
fl~'Hetcalf was s tntck by a passenger bus operated by an employee of
a. Mafla
carefree Transportation Company. In an action by Meria t·Jetcalf against the
Oampany to r ec over damages for pers onal injuri es she proved the following
facts: that plaintiff was standing on th e sidewalk at the m rner of an

intersection of two streets; that the bus, as it approached the intersection
of the two streets• ran up .on the sidewalk at the corner of the intersection
and struck the p1aintiff causing her to sustain a fracture of her right leg•
a fracture of her left arm* and a compression fracture of a lumbar vertebra;
and that the bus Has under defendantcs exclusive control. Uter proving the
foregoing facts plaintiff rested her case, whereupon defendant moved the
court to strike plaintiff¢s evidence and to enter summary judglnent for
~~'tt ~~i~l1\i lSi\ ~l%iiiif:f had not proved any specific act of
negligence on the part of defendant~

•

The court shotl.d overrule this motion. The facts of this case clearly
present a situation under which the doctrine of resipsa loquitur applies.
l·llten a vehicle, under exclusive control of the defendant, leaves a vehicular
thoroughfare and enters upon a city sideHalk• a place set aside for pedestrians, any injury inflicted is clearly the fault of the plaintiff under
res ipsa. The burden is thus upon the defendant Bus Company to present
evidence showing that t~ere was no negligenff e on the pnrt of its agent.
_!-90 Va 979 §. £'A.-U-~ .-.-# ~~· (-u-~ c~
¥~·
.
lr';'fl:..:~. h/; ~
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9. An ~dictment was returned in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County,
Virginia, against Marrow Bone charging that he illegally practiced law
before that Court. On motion of Bone this indictment was quashed and
dismissed upon the ground that the offense charged was barred by the statute
of limitations. Shortly after the indictment had been dismissed, Bone
commenced an action in the Circuit Court of that County against Sam Barrister
to recover damages for malicious prosecution. In his motion for judgment
Bone charged that Barrister maliciously and without probable cause procured
the indictment; that the ind ictrnen t had been dismissed as the offense
was barred by the statute of limitetions; and th<'lt Bone had been seriously
damaged in his reputation as a result of the procurement of the indictment.
Barrister filed grounds of defense adr1itting that the offense chnrged was
barred by the stDtute of limitations. lie did not r espond to the othe r
avennents contained in the motion for jud@llent, but he did charge in his
grounds of defens e that the charge ro ntained in the indictment \vas true,
and that Bone was guilty of illegally practicin~ ~. /t the trial of the
case Bone offered evidence proving that Barrister procured the indictment
and that Barrister had acted pursuant to a malicious intent on his pnrt
to injure Bone. Bone testified in his own behalf and on cross-examiuation
he admitted tl~t he did not have a license to prnctice law in Virginia,
and that the dh .:1 rge contained in the indictment was true. \rlhen plaintiff
rested his case defendant moved to strike his evidence and for summary
judgment.
How should the Court rule?
The court should sustain defendnnt.afs motion and enter summary judglnent
for him. The maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution rest on
two conditions: (1) favorable termination of the case on the merits; and
(2) lack of probable cause for the action to be brought. \olith these <D ndi:
tions mandatory, proof of nctual guilt of the person accused is a canplete
defense, even if the original prosecution h<1d ~en dis rr1issed. (193 Va 301)

(b) The form of the pleading by plaintiff is bad. To state correctly a good cause
of action for libel. slander or insulting words, the ~xact words charged to have
been used by the defendant must be alle ed. Because plaintiff failed to set out the
exact words used by defendant, his motion is insufficient under Virginia.law.
Furthermore plaintiff has not alleged special dama es, and such allegat1ons would ~
be necessa~ to sustain a caus
ac 1on where no libel per se is involved.
\"~
(173 Va.200).
~"
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6.~~son, who owned a station wagon used for g7neral family purposes, was
approached by an acquaintance, Benton, about mov~ng a bar cabinet from one part or
town to another. Caldwell, a friend of Benton, overheard the discussion and stated
that he had a stuffed gnu that he wanted to move. Allison suggested that if Caldwell
would help move .the bar, then he would move the stuffed gnu. The next day the three
men met and moved the bar, with each one having two drinks of whiskey from the wellstocked bar. They then loaded Caldwell's gnu, and enroute to their destination,
while Allison was driving in a line of traffic within the speed limit, his attention
was attracted by Jane Mainesfeld, a well-proportioned young lady in a miniskirt,
walking along the sidewalk and as they passed, Allison turned his head for about a
second to gain a well-rounded view. When he looked back, he saw to his dismay that
the traffic ahead had stopped and he crashed into the oar in front of him, causing
the stuffsd gnu to topple on Caldwell and seriously injure him.
Caldwell consults you as to his rights, if any, against Allison to recover for
his personal injuries. How would you advise him?
(TORTS) You should advise C that he has no rights as against A. The facts fail to
establish a contract of hire or relation which would give to C a status other than
that of a guest. No apparent benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, inured to A out of
any part of the activities involved. A's undertaking to assist both Band C in
what each wished to accomplish was solely a voluntary and neighborly gesture on his
part, and without consideration. Thus, the Va. Guest Statute, 8-646.1, C could only
recover from A if he can show gross negligence on the part of A. The facts show a
momentary lack of attention, not gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard
of C's safety. C has no right of action as against A.(l88 Va.207).
7.~t~Zbeat was employed by Puritan as a clothing salesman working on a commission
basis in Norfolk, Va. Deadbeat owed Strongarm a nine-~onth past-due indebtedness of
$400, for which demand for payment repeatedly had been made. Deadbeat paid Strongarm, but through negligent mishandling of his records, Strongarm did not credit
Deadbeat's account and subsequently wrote a letter to Puritan as followst
~our employee Deadbeat has owed us $400 for almost a year and has consistently
refused to pay the same. We know that you would take a dim view of an employee
of yours acting in this way toward a creditor and feel that if you explain to
him his responsibilities and liabilities and possible effects of the same upon
himself, he would be induced to make payment to us."
(c.;,.

•

Puritan showed Deadbeat the letter and angrily lectured him, but upon being
assured that the debt had been paid, Puritan told Deadbeat not to let it happe
again and sent him back to work.
n
Deadbeat brought an action at law against Strongarm by a motion for judgment a d
the paragraph of the motion for judgment stating his alleged cause of action w~sn
as follows:
"Str~ngarm did wrongfully, unlawfully and with malice write and publish to
Pur1tan a letter which w:ongfully and mistakenly alleged that Deadbeat was
ind~bted to S~ongarm,.w1th intent to force payment which was not due and/or
to 1nduce Pur1tan to d1scharge Deadbeat, all to the humiliation ridicule
and embarrassment of the plaintiff, Deadbeat, for which he is e~titled to'
compensation.u
(a) Does plaintiff, Deadbeat, have a substantive cause of action on which he rna
recover?
y
(b) Is the quoted paragraph of the motion sufficient as to form?
(TORTS)(a) Plaintiff ha~ no substantive cause of action under Virginia law. As
respects a charge of fa1lure to pay one's debts, without any imputation of insol
a writing containing the mere statement that a person who is not a trader or a vency-:
mer~hant, or engaged in any vocation wherein credit is necessary for the conduct of
bus~ness, owes a debt and refuses to pay, or owes a debt which is long past d
.
not libelous per~ and does not render the author or publisher of such stat ue,~ 18
libel without proof of special damages. Neither plaintiff's allegations nor :~env
evidence show proof of any special damages which must in fact have been diff ed
if plaintiff were to have a cause of action for libel under these circumstan~re
(182 Va.512, 200 Va.572)
es.

~

8.~?ygirl invited Shyman to her home for a cozy dinner, during which she asked
Shyman to fetch another bottle of champagne from the cellar. Upon descending to the
dimly lighted basement and turning the corner of a stairway, Shyman's left leg was
was impaled on the splintered end of a wooden board which Playgirl had left wedged
in the side of the stairwell after her last karate practice session. Shyman ascertained that Dr. Quackenbush was considered to be a competent and qualified physician
and went to him for treatment of his leg wound, during the course of which, Dr.
Quackenbush overlooked removing one of twelve minute splinters deeply imbedded in
the leg, which, other consulting physicians agreed, would have been most difficult
to detect even by the most careful examination.
After Shyman recovered from the initial disability of the actual wounds, an infection set in from the splinter which required treatment and caused a subsequent
disability. After recovery from this and after the scars were well healed and
though they were slightly unsightly only, Shyman went to Dr. Newskin, a plastic
surgeon considered to be competent and qualified, for revision of the scars on his
leg. During this operation, Dr. Newskin left a small sponge under the skin at one
incision site, and though Shyman complained of pain, Dr. Newskin ignored the
complaints and did nothing and left town for several weeks with the result that
serious complications set in and Shyman was again disabled.
Consulting physicians advised that the sponge could have been discovered at the
time of closing the incision and an examination afterward would have also revealed
the same under the skin.
Shyman consults you as to his rights of recovery, if any, against Playgirl for:
(l) the initial injury and disability,
(2) the infection and second disability while under the treatment of Dr.
Quackenbush, and
(3) the third disability as the result of Dr. Newskin's treatment.
(~RTS) (l) Playgirl is liable to
. l~ 4 •
. Wh~le the general rule, which is f~laintiff for t?e.init1al injury and disability.
to keeE his Prem~i in a saf
d llpwed in Virg1n1a, says a host is under no duty
t~ere are e~ptioos where a ~a~ ;:~;:a~l e condi ti o.n_tar___th_ELJ!§_e_ of_a licen see,
t on on the remises should real·
r has reason_t.cL knQ}LQf_ a dangerous _condiplaintiff, knows pla1ntiff wou ~~: 1 ~ i
n unreasonable risk of
to
e~c 1 se rilasonable eare to make taeJ 1 s~ve:r_ or rea.llEe t.he danger_, J!.lld fails to
defendant can be held liable. The fa en -ti-on-scrf'e-or-te--wam ~a:i,rlt!ff, then
this excep 10n to the generar rul cts of this case seem reasonably to fall under
(2) Playgirl can also be held 1" e and be controlled by it.(207 Vao343).
holds that if an injured person 1able for the second disability. The general rule
treatment the law regards the auses or~inary-ear~n-sel~~i~g-a~hysician for
act of
ph
ar. 0 ggravat1on °~ !he injury resulting from the negligeni
the..-.origina-1 injury. It is so ~
~liiiiTiedlat_e .ailcldirect-.dmrrage_s__wbich --flOl.r from
reasonably have been anticipated Alecause the aggravation under these facts could
Dr. Q were in fact negligent und;r t~' t~ere wou(ld be a question if the actions of
(3) Playgirl not liable for actions ~se acts. 181 Va.222)
N were more than the aggravation of anf Dr •. N. The subsequent negligent acts of Dr.
to anticipate Dr. N would be 80 rossl orig1 ?al injury, since it was not reasonable
in plaintiff, and then completel; d. Y negl1?ent as t? sew up a foreign substance
constituted a s eparate, and inde en~~rega.:d h1s com?la1nts. The acts of Dr .. N
not, under the law, be reasonabl; hel~tl~:~l~ff~;:~~§~n~:: ~~).w~~P;!a~~
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y fJ~lrlin worked for _the Universal Paper Co. which conducted a large operation in
Virginia, employing several hundred men. Due to the negligence of Austin, a fellow
employee, on September 16, 1967, Carlin was killed while performing his duties as a
skip operator. You are consulted as to whether Carlin's administrator can maintain
an aetion for damages for wrongful deat~.
(&) Against Austin, and (b) againat Uniersal. How ought you to advise?
(AGENCY,TORTS)The administrator cannot maintain an action for damages for wrongful
death against either the negligent employee or the employer. Every employer and
employee is conclusively presumed to have accepted the prosivions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. An~ under the Act, the rights. az:d remedies granted ~o an employer
respecting compensat1on on account of personal lnJury or death by acc1dent shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee or personal representative.
Henee no wrongful death action may be maintained. (184 Va.96; 65-37; 65-20; 65-21;
65-22)

'7

s.tbecedent was killed when his ~utomobile slipped off a jack which he was using i:
an attempt to change a tire, and his administrator sued the manufacturer of the
jack for his wrongful death. At the trial i t was proved that the accident might
have happened either because of a structural defect in the jack or because of the
failure of Decedent ~o nchock" the wheels_properly, and it .was impossible to say
which caused the acc1dent. At the conclus1on of all the evldence the manufacturer
moved the Court to strike the evidence. How ought the Court to rule on the motion?
I....., -. ..

(TOnTS) The Court should strike the evidence. The party who affirms actionable
negligence must establ~sh it by proof sufficient to satis~y.reasonable ~d well
balanced minds. The ev1dence must show more than a probablllty of a negl1gent act.
Moreover, if the injury complained of may have resulted from one of two causes, for
one of which the defendant is liable, but not for the other, the plaintiff cannot
recover. Neither can he recover if it is just as probable that the damage was caused
by the one as by the other.(l03 Va.64)
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